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O
T
I. SITUATION 
 
 
  n October 9, 2006, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) conducted a nuclear weapons test.1 In response to this provoca-
tive act, on October 14, 2006, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
imposed sanctions on the DPRK pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N 
Charter.2 Because of subsequent nuclear and ballistic missile tests by the 
DPRK since 2006, the UNSC enhanced these sanctions on a number of 
occasions, most recently in 2017.3 
Despite these robust measures, the DPRK continues to evade sanc-
tions, particularly through illicit ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum 
products and coal.4 These sanctions also failed to deter DPRK President 
Kim Jung-un from conducting further ballistic missile tests. Indeed, be-
tween July 25, 2019 and March 31, 2020, the DPRK has conducted twenty-
three ballistic missile tests in violation of numerous UNSC resolutions.5 
Given the DPRK’s economic reliance on maritime activities as well as 
its use of maritime tactics to evade sanctions, the UNSC included detailed 
maritime provisions within the sanctions to address these issues. Here, 
maritime interdiction is perhaps the most important effective way to coun-
ter illicit DPRK maritime activities. Current maritime interdiction authori-
ties under the various UNSC resolutions (UNSCR) are based on port State 
control, coastal State jurisdiction in the territorial sea and contiguous zone, 
flag State consent beyond the territorial sea, and universal jurisdiction over 
stateless vessels. While important, this approach remains flawed. 
This article examines how the international community can better en-
force these sanctions at sea. Part II sets out a solution, while Part III dis-
cusses key aspects of maritime sanctions enforcement. Part IV concludes. 
                                                                                                                  
1. 9 October 2006 – First DPRK Nuclear Test, COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN 
TREATY ORGANIZATION, https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/9-october-2006-
first-dprk-nuclear-test (last visited May 5, 2020). 
2. S.C. Res. 1718 (Sept. 14, 2006); see also U.N. Charter art. 41. 
3. S.C. Res. 1874 (June 12, 2009); S.C. Res. 2087 (Jan. 22, 2013); S.C. Res. 2094 (Mar. 
7, 2013); S.C. Res. 2270 (Mar. 2, 2016); S.C. Res. 2321 (Nov. 30, 2016); S.C. Res. 2356 
(June 2, 2017); S.C. Res. 2371 (Aug. 5, 2017); S.C. Res. 2375 (Sept. 11, 2017); S.C. Res. 
2397 (Dec. 22, 2017). 
4. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & U.S. COAST GUARD, NORTH 
KOREA SANCTIONS ADVISORY: UPDATED GUIDANCE ON ADDRESSING NORTH KOREA’S 
ILLICIT SHIPPING PRACTICES (2019) 1 [hereinafter NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS ADVISORY]. 
5. Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy, ARMS CONTROL ASSO-
CIATION, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron (last updated Apr. 2020). 
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II. SOLUTION 
 
1. Maritime sanctions enforcement would be enhanced by a UNSCR that 
authorizes “all necessary means.” A variation of this solution would be 
to allow for nonconsensual boardings of DPRK-flagged vessels. Given 
the current political dynamics in the UNSC, passage of such a resolu-
tion is not realistic in the near term. 
 
2. Alternatively, a UNSCR that requires flag States and masters to grant 
consent for boardings of their flag vessels by a foreign warship would 
enhance maritime sanctions enforcement beyond the territorial sea. 
Although this solution would provide advance notice to the flag State, 
given the sanctity of exclusive flag state jurisdiction on the high seas, it 
is unclear whether a majority of States within the international commu-
nity would support such a resolution. 
 
3. Interpret manipulation of an Automatic Identification System (AIS) or 
the alteration of a vessel’s identification as equivalent to flying more 
than one flag in order to apply Article 92(2) to establish stateless vessel 
status. Stateless vessels and ships without nationality are subject to the 
jurisdiction of all States without master consent.6 
 
4. Publicly denounce Member States at the UN that are not fully execut-
ing enforcement actions within their internal waters, territorial sea, and 
contiguous zone, as required by UNSCR 2397. 
 
5. Publicly denounce flag States at the International Maritime Organiza-
tion (IMO) that have failed to take corrective actions against their flag 
vessels that manipulate their AIS transmissions and physically alter 
their IMO number. 
 
6. Have the UNSC call on Member States operating ships in the Asia-
Pacific region to enter into bilateral or multilateral ship rider agree-
ments to facilitate boarding of suspect vessels beyond the territorial sea. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
6. NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 1. 
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III. MARITIME SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT 
 
A. Ship-to-Ship Transfers 
 
Despite the longstanding, robust trade and arms embargoes, and associated 
financial and diplomatic measures and shipping restrictions, the DPRK 
continues to evade sanctions, particularly through illicit ship-to-ship (STS) 
transfers of refined petroleum and coal. UNSCR 2375 specifically prohibits 
such STS transfers: 
 
Decides that all Member States shall prohibit their nationals, persons sub-
ject to their jurisdiction, entities incorporated in their territory or subject 
to their jurisdiction, and vessels flying their flag, from facilitating or en-
gaging in ship-to-ship transfers to or from DPRK-flagged vessels of any 
goods or items that are being supplied, sold, or transferred to or from the 
DPRK.7 
 
Nonetheless, in 2018, more than 260 tankers laden with refined petroleum 
procured from UN-prohibited STS transfers made deliveries at DPRK 
ports.8 If these tankers were fully laden, the DPRK acquired more than 
seven-and-a-half-times (3.78 million barrels) the annual amount of refined 
petroleum allowed under UNSCR 2397 (500,000 barrels).9 The DPRK has 
also resumed exporting coal to the Gulf of Tonkin region in violation of 
UNSCR 2371 (2017), which prohibits the purchase of DPRK-origin coal.10 
These illicit activities generate revenue to fund the DPRK’s nuclear weap-
ons and ballistic missile programs.  
 
B. Deceptive Shipping Practices 
 
The DPRK and other illicit actors employ a number of tactics to mask 
identities of vessels and cargo. Five such tactics are discussed below. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
7. S.C. Res. 2375, supra note 3, ¶ 11. 
8. NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 1. 
9. S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 3, ¶ 11. 
10. NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 1. 
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1. Disabling Automatic Identification System 
 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) is designed to automatically provide 
information about the ship to other ships and coastal authorities. In 2000, 
Chapter V of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) was amended to require all ships of 300 gross tonnage and up-
wards engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage 
and upwards not engaged on international voyages, and all passenger ships 
irrespective of size, to be fitted with AIS.11 Ships fitted with AIS are re-
quired to maintain AIS in operation at all times except where international 
agreements, rules, or standards provide for the protection of navigational 
information.12 DPRK-flagged vessels routinely obfuscate their movements 
by intentionally disabling their AIS transponders.13 Similarly, third-State flag 
vessels conducting STS transfers with the DPRK often disable their AIS to 
evade detection. This illicit tactic conceals the origin or destination of cargo 
associated with the DPRK and is a direct violation of SOLAS Regulation 
V/19.14 The UNSC has called on Member States to exercise enhanced vigi-
lance with regard to such practices.15 
 
2. Physically Altering Vessel Identification 
 
Passenger ships of 100 gross tonnage and upwards and all cargo ships of 
300 gross tonnage and upwards are required to prominently display their 
name and IMO number either on the ship’s hull or superstructure to facili-
tate the prevention of maritime fraud.16 This unique, seven-digit number is 
a permanent vessel identification code that remains unchanged even if the 
                                                                                                                  
11. See AIS Transponders: Regulations for Carriage of AIS, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pages/AIS.aspx 
(last visited May 6, 2020). 
12. Id. 
13. NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 2. 
14. Id. 
15. S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 3. 
16. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO] Circular Letter No.1886/Rev.6, Implementation of Resolu-
tion A.1078(28) – IMO Ship Identification Number Scheme (Aug. 8, 2016), 
http://www.iuuwatch.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/FINAL-Circular-Letter-No.-
No.1886-Rev.6-Implementation-Of-Resolution-A.107828-IMO-Ship-Identification-
Number-Scheme-Secretariat.pdf. 
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vessel transfers its flag or changes ownership or name.17 DPRK-flagged 
vessels illegally paint over their vessel names and IMO numbers to conceal 
their identities and pass themselves off as different vessels.18  
 
3. Ship-to-Ship Transfers 
 
A ship-to-ship transfer occurs when cargo is moved from one ship to an-
other while at sea, rather than in port, and can be used to conceal the origin 
or destination of the transferred cargo. The DPRK is currently operating at 
least 28 tankers that can engage in STS of refined petroleum products, and 
at least 33 cargo ships that can transport coal.19 Most STS transfers of re-
fined petroleum products occur in the East China Sea off the coast of Chi-
na, and to a lesser extent in the Yellow Sea off the Chinese and DPRK 
coasts, and the Sea of Japan off the coasts of Russia and DPRK.20 
 
4. Falsifying Cargo and Vessel Documents 
 
Without complete and accurate shipping documentation, parties to a trans-
action cannot fully understand all of the parties, goods, and vessels in-
volved in a given shipment. Some of the documentation that typically ac-
companies a shipping transaction includes bills of lading, certificates of 
origin, invoices, packing lists, proof of insurance, and lists of last ports of 
call. The DPRK regularly falsifies these documents to conceal the origin or 
destination of cargo.21 
 
5. Manipulating AIS 
 
DPRK-flagged vessels often manipulate their AIS transmissions to conceal 
the vessel’s next port of call or other information regarding the voyage. 
This tactic includes altering vessel names, IMO numbers, Maritime Mobile 
Service Identities (MMSIs), or other unique identifying information.22 
                                                                                                                  
17. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO] A. 600 (15), IMO Ship Identification Number Scheme (Jan. 
4, 1988), http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/MSAS/Pages/IMO-identification-number-
scheme.aspx. 
18. NORTH KOREA SANCTIONS ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 2. 
19. Id. at 3. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 3–4. 
22. Id. at 4. 
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C. Flag State Jurisdiction 
 
Unless otherwise provided for in a treaty or under UNCLOS, a flag State 
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over vessels that fly its flag on the high 
seas.23 The same rule applies in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).24 If 
the flag State receives a report that proper jurisdiction and control has not 
been exercised over one of its flag vessels, the flag State has an obligation 
to “investigate the matter and, if appropriate, take any action necessary to 
remedy the situation.”25  
 
D. Universal Jurisdiction 
 
Ships shall sail under the flag of only one State, and may not change their 
flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, unless there is a real transfer 
of ownership or change of registry.26 If a ship sails under “the flags of two 
or more States, using them according to convenience, [the ship] may not 
claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any other State, 
and may be assimilated to a ship without nationality.”27 Because the vessel 
is stateless, it is not entitled to the protection of any State, and is subject to 
the jurisdiction of all States. Accordingly, a stateless vessel may be boarded 
and searched beyond the territorial sea by any State without the consent of 
the master. 
A warship that encounters a foreign ship, other than a sovereign im-
mune vessel, beyond the territorial sea of another State may board the ves-
sel if there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the ship is without na-
tionality. The boarding party may check the suspect ship’s documents, and 
if suspicion remains as to its status, the boarding party may proceed to a 
                                                                                                                  
23. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 92(1), 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
24. UNCLOS Article 58(2) provides that Articles 88 to 115 apply to the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) insofar as they are not incompatible with Part V of the treaty. In 
addition, the high seas provisions of the convention (Articles 86–120) apply to all parts of 
the sea that are not included in the EEZ, territorial sea, internal waters, or archipelagic 
waters. However, Article 86 provides that it does not abridge the freedoms enjoyed by all 
States in the EEZ in accordance with Article 58. See id. arts. 58(2), 85. 
25. Id. art. 94. 
26. Id. art. 92. 
27. Id. 
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further examination of the ship.28 Indicators that a vessel may be without 
nationality include: 
 
1. The vessel displays no name, flag, or other identifying characteristics. 
2. The master, upon request, makes no claim of nationality or registry 
for the vessel. 
3. The master’s claim of nationality differs from the vessel’s papers. 
4. The claim of registry or the vessel’s display of registry is either denied 
or not affirmatively and unequivocally confirmed by the State whose 
registry is claimed. 
5. The vessel changes flags during a voyage without flag State approval. 
6. The vessel carries removable signboards showing different vessel 
names and/or homeports.29 
 
E. Areas of Operation 
 
1. Internal Waters and Ports 
 
Waters landward of the baseline used to measure the territorial sea are in-
ternal waters and are subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State.30 
Hence, a coastal State may impose on a nondiscriminatory basis any condi-
tion on ships entering its ports or internal waters, to include a requirement 
that all ships entering port, except sovereign immune vessels, will be sub-
ject to boarding and inspection without flag State consent.31 The coastal 
State also has the right to take necessary action against ships entering its 
ports and internal waters to prevent any breach of the conditions of port 
entry.32 
In the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized 
to prescribe and enforce regulations on the boarding of a vessel at a U.S. 
port before the vessel been inspected and secured.33 Customs officers may 
board any vessel at any place in the United States or within U.S. customs 
waters and “examine the manifest and other documents and papers and 
                                                                                                                  
28. Id. art. 110. 
29. U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-
12/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS (2017), §§ 3.11.2.3–3.11.2.4 [hereinafter THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. 
30. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 8. 
31. THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 29, § 4.4.4.1.6. 
32. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 25. 
33. 46 U.S.C. § 60101. 
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examine, inspect, and search the vessel . . . and any person, trunk, package, 
or cargo on board, and to this end may . . . use all necessary force to com-
pel compliance.”34 Customs officers may also seize and secure the vessel or 
cargo, “which shall become liable to seizure, and to arrest any person who 
shall become liable to arrest . . . and to use all necessary force to seize or 
arrest the same.”35 The only persons authorized to board a vessel in a U.S. 
port are customs officers, U.S. Coast Guard personnel, immigration and 
health officers, U.S. Department of Agriculture investigators, or “an agent 
of the vessel or consular officer exclusively for purposes relating to cus-
toms formalities . . . .”36 
 
2. Territorial Sea 
 
Coastal States may claim a 12-nautical mile (nm) territorial sea beyond its 
land territory and internal waters.37 Coastal States exercise sovereignty over 
the territorial sea, as well as its bed and subsoil, and the air space above the 
territorial sea.38 Accordingly, coastal States may enact laws and regulations 
related to the territorial sea to prevent, inter alia, the infringement of its cus-
toms, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations. 
Coastal State sovereignty is subject to the right of innocent passage by 
all ships through the territorial sea for the purpose of navigating through 
the territorial sea or proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at a 
roadstead or port facility.39 Passage must be continuous and expeditious, 
but includes stopping and anchoring if incidental to ordinary navigation or 
rendered necessary by force majeure, distress, or providing assistance to 
persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress at sea.40 Passage is consid-
ered innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or 
security of the coastal State.41 
Stopping to conduct an illicit STS transfer would not be considered in-
cidental to ordinary navigation and would be inconsistent with the innocent 
passage regime. Similarly, ships engaged in innocent passage may not load 
                                                                                                                  
34. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a); 19 C.F.R. § 4.1(a). 
35. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(f). 
36. 19 C.F.R. § 4.1(b)(1). 
37. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 3. 
38. Id. art. 2. 
39. Id. arts. 17, 18. 
40. Id. art. 18. 
41. Id. art. 19. 
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or unload any “commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, 
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State.”42 
An illicit STS transfer would be prejudicial to the peace, good order, and 
security of the coastal State and therefore inconsistent with the innocent 
passage regime. Because coastal States may take the necessary steps in the 
territorial sea to prevent passage that is not innocent,43 coastal State author-
ities could board and seize the vessel without flag State consent. 
U.S. Customs officers are authorized to board any vessel within the 
customs waters—waters within four leagues (12 nautical miles) of the coast 
of the United States44—without flag State consent to “examine the mani-
fest and other documents papers and examine, inspect, and search the ves-
sel . . . and every part thereof and any person . . . or cargo on board, and to 
this end . . . use all necessary force to compel compliance.”45 Similarly, the 
Coast Guard “may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, sei-
zures, and arrests upon . . . waters over which the United States has juris-
diction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws 
of the United States.”46 In such cases, Coast Guard officers may board any 
vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction or the operation of any U.S. law, without 
flag State consent to “address inquiries to those on board, examine the 
ship’s documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel 
and use all necessary force to compel compliance.”47 Further, U.S. federal 
law provides: 
 
If upon the examination of any vessel or vehicle it shall appear that a 
breach of the laws of the United States is being or has been committed so 
as to render such vessel or vehicle, or the merchandise, or any part there-
of, on board of, or brought into the United States by, 
such vessel or vehicle, liable to forfeiture or to secure any fine or penalty, 
the same shall be seized and any person who has engaged in such breach 
shall be arrested.48 
 
 
                                                                                                                  
42. Id. 
43. Id. art. 21. 
44. 19 U.S.C. § 1709(c). 
45. Id. § 1581(a). 
46. 14 U.S.C. § 89. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
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3. Contiguous Zone 
 
Coastal States may claim a 24-nm contiguous zone from the baseline from 
which the territorial sea is measured. Within this zone, the coastal State 
“may exercise the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its cus-
toms, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory 
or territorial sea; (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations 
committed within its territory or territorial sea.”49 An illicit STS transfer 
would constitute an infringement of a coastal State’s customs or fiscal laws 
or regulations, which would entitle the coastal State to board and search 
the vessel without flag State consent. 
 
4. Exclusive Economic Zone 
 
A coastal State may claim a 200-nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in 
which the State enjoys sovereign resource rights, as well as jurisdiction over 
off-shore installations and structures, marine scientific research (MSR), and 
the protection and preservation of the marine environment.50 Coastal 
States, however, do not exercise the much broader and more comprehen-
sive right of sovereignty over the zone.51 In contrast, within the EEZ, all 
States enjoy high seas freedoms of “navigation and overflight . . . and other 
internationally lawful uses of the seas related to those freedoms, such as 
those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft . . . and [which are] 
compatible with the other provisions of the Convention”52 
All States may also conduct a number of non-resource-related maritime 
law enforcement activities in foreign EEZs without coastal State consent. 
UNCLOS Article 58(2) specifically provides, “Articles 88 to 115 and other 
pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in 
so far as they are not incompatible with this Part [Part V].”53 These con-
stabulary operations include, inter alia, the right of approach and visit (Arti-
cle 110), as confirmed by Article 86.54 Although the first sentence of Article 
                                                                                                                  
49. UNCLOS, supra note 23, art. 33. 
50. Id. arts. 56, 57. 
51. Id. art. 89. Article 19 applies to the EEZ pursuant to Article 58, which confirms 
this conclusion. Further, the Article provides, “no State may validly purport to subject any 
part of the high seas to its sovereignty.” Id. 
52. Id. art. 58. 
53. Id. art. 58(2). 
54. See id. arts. 110, 86. 
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86 specifies that the EEZ is sui generis, and that certain resource-related high 
seas freedoms, such as resource exploitation, fishing, and MSR do not ap-
ply in the EEZ, the second sentence clarifies that nothing in Article 86 
abridges the high seas “freedoms enjoyed by all States in the EEZ in ac-
cordance with Article 58.” Consequently, even though the maritime inter-
diction provisions of UNSCR 2375 and 2397 refer to the “high seas,” they 
should be interpreted to include the EEZ. 
 
5. High Seas 
 
Unless otherwise provided for in an international treaty, ships on the high 
seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State.55 The mari-
time interdiction provisions of UNSCR 2375 and 2397 are based on this 
long-standing principle of international law. Thus, unless the suspect vessel 
is stateless or is assimilated to be stateless, vessels enforcing the UN sanc-
tions must have flag State consent to board and search a suspect vessel.56 
Only warships and other duly authorized ships or aircraft may execute 
the right of visit under Article 110.57 In the United States, although Navy 
warships can exercise the right of visit, the Coast Guard is the primary law 
enforcement agency to make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, 
seizures, and arrests upon the high seas to prevent, detect, and suppress 
violations of U.S. laws, and may use all necessary force to compel compli-
ance.58 
 
F. Implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
 
The maritime interdiction provisions of the UNSCRs are consistent with 
UNCLOS and are based on port State, coastal State, and flag State consent. 
These resolutions do not preclude States from exercising jurisdiction over 
stateless vessels. In this regard, operative paragraph 12 of UNSCR 2375 
                                                                                                                  
55. Id. art. 92. 
56. Id. arts. 92, 110. 
57. Security Council Resolution 2375 confirms this requirement. See S.C. Res. 2375, 
supra note 3, ¶ 10. 
Affirms that paragraph 7 contemplates only inspections carried out by warships and other 
ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and au-
thorized to that effect, and underscores that it does not apply with respect to inspection of 
vessels entitled to sovereign immunity under international law. 
58. 14 U.S.C. § 89. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 
specifically provides that the maritime interdiction provisions of the UN-
SCR do not “affect the rights, obligations, or responsibilities of Member 
States under international law, including . . . UNCLOS, with respect to any 
other situation . . . .”59 
UNSCR 2375 calls on Member States to board and inspect vessels on 
the high seas if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of 
the vessel contains items that are prohibited by applicable UNSCRs. Such 
boardings and inspections, however, require prior flag State consent. Flag 
States are encouraged to cooperate with requests for inspections, and if 
they do not consent, they are required to divert the vessel to an appropriate 
and convenient port for an inspection by local authorities.60 If the flag State 
neither consents to the inspection nor diverts the vessel to an appropriate 
port for inspection, or the master refuses to allow a flag State-approved 
inspection on the high seas or refuses to proceed to a designated port for 
inspection as directed by the flag State, the UN Sanction Committee shall 
consider designating the vessel for measures under UNSCR 1718 (asset 
freeze) and UNSCR 2321 (universal denial of port entry), and the flag State 
shall deregister the vessel.61 If a requesting State does not receive the coop-
eration of the flag State, the requesting State shall submit a report to the 
Committee and request that the Committee publicly release information 
regarding the vessel and flag State involved.62 
UNSCR 2397 requires port States to seize, inspect, and impound any 
vessel in their ports that has illicitly exported coal and other prohibited 
items through deceptive maritime practices and illegally engaged in STS 
transfers.63 UNSCR 2397 further requires Member States to share maritime 
and shipping information regarding illicit cargo transfers, and prohibits 
Member States from providing insurance or re-insurance services to vessels 
they have reasonable grounds to believe were involved in activities, or the 
transport of items, prohibited by applicable UNSCRs.64 The resolution also 
mandates that Member States de-register any vessel they have reasonable 
grounds to believe was involved in activities, or the transport of items, 
prohibited by relevant UNSCRs, and further prohibits Member States from 
                                                                                                                  
59. S.C. Res. 2375, supra note 3. 
60. These inspections are conducted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2270. 
See S.C. Res. 2270, supra note 3, ¶ 18. 
61. S.C. Res. 1874, supra note 3, ¶ 13. 
62. Id. ¶ 16. 
63. S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 3, ¶ 9. 
64. Id. ¶ 11. 
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providing classification services to such a vessel and from registering any 
vessel that has been de-registered by another Member State for violating 
the UN sanctions.65 Further, the resolution prohibits the sale or transfer of 
new or used vessels to the DPRK.66 Finally, if a Member State has infor-
mation regarding a vessel that has been designated by the UNSC or the 
Sanctions Committee as subject to an asset freeze or the port entry ban, the 
Member State shall notify the Committee.67 
UNSCR 2375 and UNSCR 2397 suffer from the same weakness—they 
are based on flag State consent and are adopted pursuant to Article 41 of 
the U.N. Charter, which only allows measures not involving the use of 
force. Although UNSCR 2375 calls on flag States to cooperate with re-
quests to board their vessels on the high seas, it is unlikely that the DPRK, 
China, or Russia will accede to such a request. Nor is it likely that these 
States, having failed to give consent for a third-party boarding, would direct 
one of their vessels to proceed to an appropriate and convenient port for 
an inspection by local authorities, as required by UNSCR 2375. 
The UNSC has broad authority under Chapter VII of the Charter to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Pursuant to Article 39, 
“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommen-
dations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 
41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”68 Article 
41 includes a list of measures that do not involve the use of force, which 
may be applied to give effect to its decisions, stating: 
 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may 
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of com-
munication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.69 
 
If the UNSC considers that Article 41 measures “would be inadequate 
or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
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forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.”70 The UNSC has authorized maritime enforcement action under 
Article 42 in only five situations: Southern Rhodesia (1965), Iraq (1990), 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1991–93), Haiti (1994), and Libya (2011).71 
Each of these operations used ships and aircraft from the armed forces of 
Member States to interdict maritime shipping beyond the territorial sea 
without flag State consent. 
It is obvious from the DPRK’s recent actions that U.N. sanctions and 
enforcement measures under Article 41 have been inadequate to convince 
Kim Jung-un to abandon his nuclear weapons program or dissuade the 
North Korean leader from conducting further ballistic missile tests. Ac-
cordingly, the DPRK government remains a threat to the peace under Arti-
cle 39. The only way to achieve the desired end state—the denuclearization 
of the Korean Peninsula and a restoration of international peace and secu-
rity—is to impose enforcement measures under Article 42, to include non-
consensual boardings beyond the territorial sea. 
The best model for such enforcement action is the maritime interdic-
tion operation against Iraq in 1990. Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 
and the UNSC adopted UNSCR 660 the same day. This resolution con-
demned the invasion and demanded that Iraq withdraw immediately and 
unconditionally all Iraqi military forces from Kuwait.72 After Iraq refused to 
withdraw its forces, the UNSC passed UNSCR 661 on August 6, which 
imposed a general embargo on all trade with Iraq and Kuwait to induce 
Iraq to comply with UNSCR 660.73 The embargo specifically called on 
States to refrain from using their flag vessels to trade with Iraq.74 Contin-
ued noncompliance from the Iraqi government led to the adoption of UN-
SCR 665 on August 25, 1990, which imposed a traditional maritime block-
ade.75 Member States were authorized to “use such measures commensu-
rate to the . . . circumstances as may be necessary . . . to halt all inward and 
outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and 
destinations . . . .”76 The phrase—“such measures . . . as may be neces-
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sary”—removed any doubt that the UNSCR 661 embargo was an en-
forcement action under Article 42, which would be implemented by mili-
tary force. 
Under the coordination of the Commander, Middle East Force, 165 
ships from fourteen coalition partners conducted maritime interception 
operations (MIO) in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Oman 
to halt oil exports from Iraq and prevent the importation of war materials 
into the country.77 Merchant ships in the area of operation were tracked 
and identified, and ships suspected of containing contraband bound for 
Iraq or Kuwait were boarded, searched, and diverted to a convenient port 
if they were found to have violated the UN sanctions.78 The MIO cam-
paign successfully stopped the flow of oil out of Iraq, which accounted for 
95 percent of the country’s revenue.79 The Maritime Interdiction Force 
(MIF) also prevented resupply of much needed war materiel for the Iraqi 
Armed Forces. Over an eight-month period, the MIF challenged more 
than 9,000 commercial vessels, boarded and inspected 1,100 of these ves-
sels, and diverted more than sixty ships transporting over one million tons 
of prohibited cargo.80 
 
G. Bilateral Shiprider and Boarding Agreements 
 
International cooperation is essential to the successful enforcement of UN 
sanctions at sea. To facilitate that cooperation, Member States should be 
encouraged to enter into bilateral shiprider and boarding agreements that 
provide authority on a bilateral basis to board and search ships beyond the 
territorial sea suspected of violating the UN sanctions against the DPRK. 
Such agreements can be used to streamline the lengthy diplomatic process 
required to obtain flag State consent for sanctions enforcement against 
suspect vessels on the high seas. 
Obtaining flag State consent to board and search a vessel at sea can be 
extremely time consuming. Once a suspect vessel is detected and a request 
is made to board, it may take several hours before the flag State grants au-
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thorization to board and search the vessel. During non-working hours or 
weekends and holidays, the lag time between request and response can be 
compounded. Suspect vessels exploit these delays by fleeing into the terri-
torial sea of a nearby country, thus precluding enforcement action by the 
requesting State unless the affected coastal State authorizes hot pursuit of 
the suspect vessel into its territorial sea. Bilateral agreements can provide 
the necessary advance authorization to ensure the requesting State can ef-
fectively intervene while the suspect ship is still on the high seas. 
Shiprider and boarding agreements facilitate bilateral cooperation by es-
tablishing procedures to board and search suspect vessels on the high seas 
in order to prevent sanctions violations. If a ship registered in Country X 
or Country Y is suspected of violating the UN sanctions, either Party to the 
agreement can request the other to confirm the nationality of the ship and, 
if needed, authorize the boarding, search, and possible detention of the 
vessel and its cargo. 
To illustrate, the United States maintains forty counterdrug bilateral 
agreements and operational procedures with partner States throughout the 
world that allow the U.S. Coast Guard “to board suspect vessels, facilitate 
interdictions in under-patrolled territorial waters of partner nations, and 
coordinate interdiction and apprehension operations in the transit zone.”81 
Such agreements increase the business risk for drug smugglers and are a 
force multiplier for U.S. interdiction efforts. In fiscal year 2018, 66 percent 
of all Coast Guard drug interdictions involved the use of a bilateral or op-
erational procedures agreement.82 
The United States has also entered into eleven bilateral boarding 
agreements under the Proliferation Security Initiative with Antigua and 
Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Is-
lands, Mongolia, Panama, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, which 
allow for the boarding and inspection of suspect vessels seaward of the ter-
ritorial sea.83 These countries represent over 60 percent of the world’s 
shipping in terms of deadweight tonnage.84 
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Based on its experience, the United States has developed a comprehen-
sive model boarding agreement that enables U.S. maritime interdiction 
forces to work more effectively and efficiently with other nations. The 
model agreement includes standing authority to take the following actions: 
 
1. Board and search foreign flag vessels of a signatory nation;  
2. Embark a shiprider empowered to authorize patrols, boardings, 
searches, seizures, and arrests in the signatory’s territorial sea;  
3. Pursuit of suspect vessels into the signatory’s territorial sea, with 
permission to stop, board, and search the vessel;  
4. Entry into the signatory’s territorial sea to investigate suspect vessels 
and aircraft, with permission to stop, board, and search;  
5. Overflight by state aircraft in the signatory’s national airspace in sup-
port of interdiction operations, and authority to relay orders to land 
in the territory of a signatory nation.85 
 
The model agreement also contains provisions that allow the flag or 
coastal State to exercise or waive prosecutorial jurisdiction over a suspected 
vessel or persons if contraband is found on board. The agreements may 
additionally contain “provisions for disposition of seized assets, including 
transfer of forfeited assets or proceeds of their sale as a consequence of 
any interdictions.”86 Bilateral agreements can also provide the basis for pro-
fessional education and training for partner States, thereby fusing capacity 
building with operational collaboration. 
The United States recognizes, however, that not all bilateral boarding 
agreements will be the same. Understandably, some agreements will be 
“more limited in scope than others, depending on the threat, the views or 
concerns of sovereignty by the partner nation, and the operational impera-
tive to reach agreement.”87 
 
H. Stateless Vessels and Vessels without Nationality Indicators 
 
As discussed above, stateless vessels and vessels without nationality are 
subject to the enforcement jurisdiction of all States beyond the territorial 
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sea. To facilitate the identification of stateless vessels, the UNSC should 
develop a checklist of conduct that could lead a vessel to be treated as 
stateless or without nationality. Some of the factors the UNSC should con-
sider include: 
 
1. The vessel is not legitimately registered in any one State. 
2. The vessel is not displaying a name, flag, or other identifying charac-
teristics. 
3. The master, upon request, makes no claim of nationality or registry 
for the vessel. 
4. The master, upon request, makes a claim of nationality or registry 
that is inconsistent with the ship’s documents. 
5. The claim of registry or the vessel’s display of registry is either denied 
or not confirmed by the State whose registry is claimed. 
6. The vessel changes flags during a voyage without flag State approval. 
7. The vessel is carrying removable signboards showing different vessel 
names or homeports. 
8. The vessel physically alters its IMO number or Maritime Mobile Ser-
vice Identities (MMSI) number. 
9. The vessel sails under two or more flags, using them according to 
convenience. 
 
Note that a ship that sails under two or more flags may not claim any of 
the nationalities in question with respect to any other State, and may be 
assimilated to a ship without nationality.88 Under such circumstances, fur-
ther action by a warship to verify the status of the ship is not required, and 
the ships may be immediately boarded, searched, and its crew detained 
without the consent of the master.89 
 
I. Manipulation of AIS Transmissions 
 
AIS provides information about the ship to other ships and to coastal au-
thorities automatically. SOLAS Regulation V/19 requires that AIS auto-
matically provide information, including the ship’s identity, type, position, 
course, speed, navigational status, and other safety-related information to 
appropriately equipped shore stations, other ships, and aircraft.90 An AIS 
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transceiver sends data every two to ten seconds depending on a vessel’s 
speed while underway, and every three minutes while a vessel is at anchor, 
including the vessel’s MMSI number. Additional data is broadcast every six 
minutes, including IMO ship identification number, international radio call 
sign assigned to the vessel by the country of registry, and the name of the 
vessel. Manipulating this data to reflect a different flag State is effectively 
equivalent to flying more than one flag, thus allowing the vessel to be as-
similated to a vessel without nationality under UNCLOS Article 92. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
DPRK sanctions evasion, particularly as it relates to maritime activities, 
remains a critical issue that allows the DRPK government to continue its 
pursuit of nuclear weapons and its testing and amassment of ballistic mis-
siles. The UNSC continues to consider these activities a threat to interna-
tional peace and security. A stronger application of maritime sanctions en-
forcement through the adoption of the proposals described above will bet-
ter enforce UNSCRs and push the DPRK to abandon these activities. Do-
ing so will result in a more stable and secure international order. 
 
